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 DEVELOPING NEW MEASUREMENTS OF STATE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
          
Vladimir Popov 
 
What do we mean by state capacity? Most would agree that this is the ability of the state to 
provide goods and services that the state is responsible for, although many would disagree on 
what exactly are the responsibilities of the state. According to a narrow definition, institutional 
capacity of the state is the ability of the government to enforce laws and regulations. There are 
a lot of subjective indices (control over corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, etc.) 
that are designed to measure the state institutional capacity and are based on experts’ estimates. 
But many researchers consider them biased and do not think they help to explain economic 
performance1.  
 
Very often data from different sources show diverging trends. According to the World Bank 
(WB) control over corruption index (fig. 1), in 2000-05 corruption was falling in Russia and 
increasing in China, whereas Transparency International corruption perception index (figure 2) 
suggests that corruption in Russia actually increased and did not change much in China. 
Moreover, according to the WB control over corruption index, in 2005 Russia and China were 
at par, whereas judging by Transparency International index China was 2 times cleaner than 
Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Mushtaq H. Khan. Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s. DESA Working Paper No. 
54, August 2007. http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp54_2007.pdf 
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Figure 1  
 
Control over corruption indices in Russia and China (points, 
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5)
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Source: World Bank.  
Figure 2  
Corruption perception indices (Transparency International) 
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
1980-85 1995 2002 2003 2004 2005
China
Russia
India
 
Source: Transparency International.  
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The logical objective measures of the state institutional capacity are the murder rate – non-
compliance with the state’s monopoly on violence (figure 3), and the shadow economy – non 
compliance with the economic regulations (see figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 3. Murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants and government effectiveness index 
(ranges from -2.5 to +2.5) in 2002  
Left chart – countries with low (0-3) murder rate; right chart – countries with high (15-
75) murder rate 
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Source: WHO, World Bank.  
  
 
Crime rate – non-compliance with all state laws – would be an even better indicator. But 
crimes are registered differently in different countries — higher crime rates in developed 
countries seem to be the result of better registration of crimes. However, grave crimes, like 
murders, appear to be registered quite accurately even in developing countries, so international 
comparison of murder rates is well warranted. 
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Shadow economy estimates are not very reliable, but at least they are not subjective. They are 
derived from the comparison of official output and variables that are closely tied to output and 
are believed to be registered better than output (energy and electricity consumption, 
transportation activity, tax revenues, employment, demand for real cash balances). Estimates of 
the shadow economy derived by each of these methods vary a great deal, but hopefully reflect 
some real phenomena (see source to figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Share of the shadow economy in GDP in 2005, %, and government effectiveness 
index in 2002 
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Source: World Bank. Data on shadow economy are from: Friedrich Schneider.  Shadow 
Economies and Corruption All Over the World: New Estimates for 145 Countries. – 
Economics. Open Access, Open Assessment E-Journal, No. 2007-9 July 24, 2007 (measures of 
the shadow economy are derived from divergence between output dynamics and electricity 
consumption, demand for real cash balances, etc.).  
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       General patterns 
All measures of institutional capacity are strongly correlated. The general pattern is that 
developed countries, East Asia (EA) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Eastern 
Europe (EE) countries usually have better indicators of institutional capacity, whereas in Sub-
Sahara Africa (SSA), Latin America (LA) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) lag 
behind. The first group of countries in most cases had less than 3 murders in 2002 per 100,000 
inhabitants: 1-2 in Europe and Japan (although over 5 in the US) and 2-3 in East Asia and 
MENA (once again, there are exceptions, like Philippines and Thailand) , whereas in LA, SSA, 
many CIS states murder rates were normally higher by the order of magnitude. By way of 
comparison, it took Western Europe 300 years to move from a murder rate of over 40 per 
100,000 inhabitants in the 16th century to current levels of 1-2 murders per 100,000 inhabitants 
in the 19th century and beyond (figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5. Homicide rates in some Western countries since 1500 
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Source: M. Eisner. Long-Term Historical Trends in Violent Crime, published in Crime and 
Justice, Vol. 30 (2003), pp 83-142. 
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The same goes for shadow economy – it is larger in SSA, LA, and CIS countries (about 50% of 
GDP), but in EA and MENA it is close to the low levels of Western countries (10-30% of 
GDP). South Asia is in between these two groups on most indicators of institutional capacity.  
 
    The devil is in details…  
However, differences in the ranking of countries on subjective (government effectiveness) and 
objective (murder rate, shadow economy) measures are significant. The subjective index of 
government is measured on a scale of -2.5 to +2.5, the higher, the better government 
effectiveness. EA and MENA states do not get the same high ranking in government 
effectiveness, as in the ability to contain the murder rate and the shadow economy.  
 
It could be expected that the share of the shadow economy is lower in countries with better 
institutional capacity of the state. But in fact this is not the case. Neither of the subjective 
indices (corruption perception index, investment climate index, rule of law index, government 
effectiveness index) helps to explain the share of shadow economy in GDP after controlling for 
the level of GDP per capita. This is very much against intuition and raises serious concerns 
about the quality of these subjective indices.   
 
Besides, it appears that political regime (democratic or authoritarian) matters for the subjective 
ranking. It could be shown, for instance, that out of two countries with the same murder rate, 
government effectiveness is higher in countries that were more democratic in the past  (1970s-
1990s on average) and in the year (2002) when government effectiveness was measured.2 This 
result holds for all other five WB subjective indices of institutional capacity – rule of law, 
control over corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and regulation quality. And 
                                                 
2 GE2002 =1.36 - 0.03MURDER2002 - 0.22DEMaver - 0.08DEM02       
             (-4.83)                  (-4.93)             (-2.11) 
 Adj R-squared = 0.52, Number of obs. = 186, Significance - 4% or less (T-statistics in brackets below).  
GE2002 - Index of government effectiveness in 2002, 
MURDER2002 - murder rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) in 2002, 
DEMaver and DEM02 - levels of authoritarianism - average for 1972-2002 and in 2002 respectively 
(political rights index of the Freedom House, ranging from 1 to 7, the higher the more authoritarian). 
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they hold also for the share of shadow economy: out of two countries with the same share of 
shadow economy, government effectiveness is higher in a more democratic one.  
 
Concrete examples may help to get a clearer picture. The shadow economy in China is less 
than 17% of GDP, lower than in Belgium, Portugal, Spain, whereas in developing countries it 
is typically around 40%, sometimes even over 60%. Only few developing countries have such 
low share of shadow economy, in particular, Vietnam and some MENA countries (Iran, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria). The murder rate in China is less then 3 persons per 100,000 inhabitants – 
one of the best records in developing countries. However, in terms of government effectiveness 
index, China (0.1) is close to Panama (-0.1) with the murder rate of 19 people per 100,000 
inhabitants and the shadow economy of over 60% of GDP.  
 
Among three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – that became members of the 
European Union in 2004 the highest murder rates and the shares of shadow economy were 
observed in Estonia and Latvia (13-15 per 100,000 inhabitants and 38-39% respectively), 
whereas in Lithuania the indicators were better (2 per 100,000 and 30% respectively).  
However the indices of government effectiveness were higher in Estonia and Latvia (0.7-0.8) 
than in Lithuania (0.6). Not to speak about China with much better record of containment of 
shadow economy and violent crime, but with government effectiveness index close to zero.  
 
Government effectiveness index in 2002 in Iran (-0.5) was the same as in Russia (-0.47), but 
the murder rate in Russia was over 8 times higher (33 against 4), the share of shadow economy 
– more than 2 times higher (47% against 20%).  
 
More indicators of government capacity are needed  
It is possible that governments, which are less efficient in fighting violent crimes and in 
containing the shadow economy, have a better record in other areas of government 
management. But it is also possible that subjective indices are biased: more democratic 
governments are getting better ratings in government effectiveness, rule of law, control over 
the corruption and other indices. Sometimes these indicators are strongly correlated, i.e. the 
improvement of the institutional capacity goes hand in hand with the increase in democracy, 
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but in many instances in developing countries democratization undermines institutional 
capacity. 
 
Statistical analysis shows that despite intuition, democratization, as measured by increase in 
the political rights index of the Freedom House, leads to the deterioration of institutional 
capacity, if was poor quality to begin with3. This is true not only for subjective measures, but 
also for the objective ones – the share of shadow economy and the murder rate. There is in fact 
a threshold relationship: if institutional capacity is above the threshold, democratization 
improves the quality of institutions, but if it is below the threshold, democratizations leads to 
the deterioration of institutional quality4.  
  
There is a need to develop new measures of institutional capacity that are based on objective 
indicators of provision of public goods, like law and order, health care, education, social 
services, infrastructure. These are not indicators of government expenditure in these areas, but 
the indicators of the achievements in the area where the government spends the money (higher 
life expectancy, lower morbidity, higher literacy, better scores in international maths 
competitions, etc.). The problem, of course, is to determine to what extent these achievements 
should be attributed to the government activities and to what extent they are due to private 
efforts.  
                                                 
3 Victor Polterovich, Vladimir Popov. Democratization, Quality of Institutions and Economic growth. – In: 
Political Institutions And Development. Failed Expectations and Renewed Hopes. Edited by Natalia Dinello and 
Vladimir Popov. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007. 
 
4 The typical relationship is this one:  
 
S = 37.50 - 0.002Y – 22.70Tr  + 0.86 ∆ (4.35 – CPI),  
      (4.25)    (-2.44)      (-4.16)      (4.83)         (-6.59) 
 Adj R-squared =0.78, Number of obs. = 33, Significance - 2% or less (T-statistics in brackets below), 
 
where S – share of shadow economy,  ∆ – democratization in 1970-2000 (increase in political rights index, 
points), CPI – corruption perception index in 1980-85, Y – PPP GDP per capita in 1975; Tr denotes a dummy 
variable for transition countries.  
 
It means that in relatively “clean” countries democratization reduces the share of shadow economy, but in corrupt 
countries democratization leads to the increase of unofficial economy. The threshold level of corruption 
perception index in 1980-85 was 4.35 – in between Portugal and Greece.  
 
If  CPI is included as a linear term, it turns out to be most insignificant and  does not increase R-squared. Thus the  
threshold hypothesis is supported.  
 8
